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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j). It subsequently assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals,
which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues
A. Whether the trial court failed to properly consider Appellant's arguments
regarding spot zoning, discrimination and unlawful taking. (Record, page 91 - 94.)
B. Whether the trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to continue its
use of lot 14, Newport Subdivision as a preexisting use pursuant to §12-22-101, Woods
Cross Ordinances. (R. at page 151, p.9)
C. Whether the trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to use the
property as an accessory use to that of its legal use of property in Woods Cross and West
Bountiful, pursuant to §12-14-104, Woods Cross Ordinances. (R. at page 151, p.8)
Standard of Review
These issues were resolved by Motion For Summary Judgment, therefore the
appellate court reviews them for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,
1004 (Utah 1994).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated, §10-9-408
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or
structure may be continued.
(b) a nonconforming use may be extended through the same
building, provided no structural alteration of the building is
proposed or made for the purpose of the extension.

Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(f) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that
he cannot for t reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or it may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Woods Cross City Ordinances, §1244-104
Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the permitted uses
and conditional uses provided herein may be approved by the city in
accordance with the provisions of this title.
Woods Cross City Ordinances, §12-22-101
This Chapter shall apply to the existing use of a building, structure or land
lawfully established at the time of passage fo the zoning ordinance or any
amendments thereto which does not conform to the present regulations of
the zone in which it is located. Because Woods Cross is a community which
has developed over a long period of time, the regulations of this Chapter are
to allow continued use of such property or structure, while at the same time
protecting existing conforming development and further orderly
development and improvement of the community.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Nature of the Proceeding
This appeal is from an order granting Woods Cross City motion for Summary

judgment entered by Judge Darwin C. Hansen, Second District Court, Davis County on
October 16, 2000.
II

Course of Proceedings & Disposition in the Trial Court
On August 15, 1999, Woods Cross City filed a complaint in the Second District

Court claiming that Douglas Smith was in violation of Woods Cross City's zoning laws
with respect to the use of certain lots located in the Newport Subdivision in Woods Cross
City. On or about June 5, 2000, Woods Cross City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
which was granted by the trial court on October 16, 2000.
II

Statement of Relevant Facts
Defendant/Appellant Douglas R. Smith is the owner of real property at issue herein

and located in the Newport Subdivision in Woods Cross City. [R. at 30] It adjoins his
property located within West Bountiful City. [R. at 33] Defendant Douglas Smith leases
all the property to Ralph Smith Company, a trucking company, which has continuously
used the property located inside and outside the Newport Subdivision since before 1991 to
run its trucking business. The trucking company's office and repair buildings are legally
operating and are within West Bountiful. [R. at 33] The property in Woods Cross is used
to park and store trucks and equipment. [R. at 30] Woods Cross sued Douglas Smith to
^

restrict his use of that portion of his property located in Woods Cross and within the
Newport Subdivision. [R. at 4]
Prior to purchasing said Newport subdivision property, continuously since 1986,
Ralph Smith Co. had leased and used and continues to lease and use lot 14 of the
Newport subdivision as part of its tucking business. [R. at 111]
Most, if not all of the property around Defendant's site does not comply with the
city's stated zoning classification. [R. at 111] The property located directly east of lot 5 of
said subdivision is owned by Defendant or Phillips 66 Company (Phillips 66 uses said
property as a buffer zone for possible pressure explosion). The property along the eastern
edge of Defendant's property is a rail road track. Plaintiff, Woods Cross City owns lot 6 of
said subdivision and upon information and belief plan to dig a flood-water catch-pond on
said site. Other Newport subdivision lots are used as a contractor's open storage lot, steel
fabrication plant, paint manufacturing plant, battery company's warehouse and truck
parking, insulation company's truck yard, fiberglass fabrication shop, cargo trailers storage
lot, open storage lots, and green concrete, shipping containers and equipment storage.
There are high voltage power lines and towers which cross the Newport subdivision
property, including the property of Defendant. The use of Defendant's property is
consistent with other property uses in the area, especially the Newport subdivision lots.
[R. at 111 -112.]
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The current zoning ordinance covering this property was enacted in December 17,
199L Prior to December 17, 1991, the property in question was zoned as MA which
permitted any use permitted in a C-2 zone. C-2 zones, at all relevant times allowed for the
operation of transfer companies. [R. at 96 and 106]
Defendant Douglas R. Smith believes that he should be allowed to continuing the
property as a preexisting use on lot 14, and other lots as an "accessory use" pursuant to
§12-14-104, Woods Cross Ordinances.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court incorrectly failed to consider Defendant's defenses of spot zoning,
discrimination, and unlawful taking of property without just compensation. Defendant
put Plaintiff on notice of Defendant's intent to raise affirmative defenses in his answer,
reiterated that notice in his Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance and made a motion to
amend his answer if the trial court deemed it necessary. Defendant further adequately
raised those affirmative defenses in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment by specifically naming each affirmative defense and providing supporting
evidence and relevant legal authority. Said defenses raised material questions of fact
which would have precluded summary judgment.
Further the trial court incorrectly failed to find a valid non-conforming use as to lot
14 of the Newport subdivision which has been used as part of the trucking business since
1986. Last, the trial court incorrectly failed to consider and find that Defendant was
-5-

entitled to use the property as an accessory use pursuant to Woods Cross Ordinance §1214404.
ARGUMENT
L

The Trial Court Incorrectly Refused to Consider Appellant's Arguments
Regarding Spot Zoning, Discrimination, and Unlawful Taking of Property
Without Just Compensation*
In its order granting Summary Judgment to Appellee, Woods Cross City, the trial

court stated:
Defendant's claims of spot zoning, discrimination and an unlawful taking of
property without just compensation have not been properly raised through
pleadings or affidavits and therefore may not be considered by the court.
No further statement or consideration regarding these issues was given by the court. Nor
did the court even comment on Defendant's claim of an accessory use which was brought
up in oral arguments on the Summary Judgment Motion. Defendant submits that these
arguments were brought before and submitted to the trial court and should have been
considered.

A« Affirmative Defenses Were Raised in Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion
In Defendant's Answer, Defendant put Plaintiff on notice and reserved the right to
claim any affirmative defenses that were found to exist through discovery. [R. at 11. ]
When Plaintiff, Woods Cross City filed its motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant
filed a motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f) to get time for discovery.
4*

Defendant specifically noted that the discovery was needed in order to identify possible
affirmative defenses. [R. at 63] Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Rule 56(f)
motion argued that as no affirmative defenses had been raised in Defendant's answer, they
were too late. [R. at 59-60] Defendant's Reply Memorandum argued that the affirmative
defenses were adequately raised under the liberalized notice pleading practice, but in the
alternative included a Motion to Amend Answer if the court were to disagree that the
affirmative defenses could be raised.1 [R. at 65]. The Court granted Defendants Rule
56(f) motion to continue and made no ruling regarding Defendants Motion to Amend
Answer. [R. at 80] Defendant submits that the Court's granting of Defendant's Rule 56(f)
motion and ignoring the Motion to Amend Answer included an implied ruling that
Defendant could raise its affirmative defenses and they would be considered for summary
judgment. If such is not the case, then the trial court improperly considered the summary
judgment motion without first ruling on Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer.
B» The Specific Affirmative Defenses Were Properly Raised in Defendant's
Memorandum In Opposition to Summary Judgment.
In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 996 P.2d 884, (Utah 1998), the court set forth
the three prong test of whether an issue had been adequately raised to be considered in
summary judgment and thus could be considered on appeal. Specifically, the court stated:

lr

Though Defendant did not name what affirmative defenses it was considering,
both the memorandum and supporting affidavit made it clear that the affirmative defenses
would be based on other land usage in the area.
-7-

That is, a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue, A
trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are
met: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority. The purpose of such requirements is to put the
Judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. (Citations and
Quotations omitted)
Defendant submits that this same test is what a trial court must use to determine whether
an issue has been adequately raised so that the trial court should consider it. Further,
Defendant submits that the issues of spot zoning, discrimination and unlawful taking of
property without just compensation were in fact adequately raised and should have been
considered by the trial court.
L Issues were raised in a timely fashion.
As was shown above by raising the affirmative defenses in its Rule 56(f) motion
and Motion to Amend Answer, Defendant put Plaintiff and the court on notice as soon as
practicable that it intended to raise affirmative defenses discovered in discovery and made
a Motion to Amend Answer so that proper procedure could be followed. The court by
granting the Rule 56(f) motion and not ruling on the Motion to Amend, by implication
held that any affirmative defenses raised in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment would be timely.

*8-

2»

Issues Were Specifically Raised

Defendant in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
specifically raised the issues of spot zoning, discrimination, and taking of property without
just compensation. In fact each such issue had its own heading and at least one paragraph
devoted solely to that specific issue. [R. at 90-94]
3* Defendant introduced supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority for each issue*
Again in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment each issue raised was supported by the affidavit testimony of the property owner
Douglas Smith. In said affidavit Douglas Smith indicated that his property is virtually
surrounded by property which does not conform to the zoning classification which
supports his spot zoning claim and discrimination. He also indicated that considering the
non-conforming uses of the other property around him, and the current zoning
classification, he would be left with no other viable use for his property which supports his
claim of a taking of property with just compensation. [R. 110-112]
Defendant also cited relevant legal authority for each issue. He cited
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Association, v. Engh Floral Company 545 P.2d. 1150
(Utah 1976) wl>ich outlines what creates an illegal spot zone. He cited Marshall v. Salt
Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P-2d 704, (1943) which holds that courts may set aside
zoning that is confiscatory or discriminatory in support of his claims of discrimination and
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taking of property without just compensation. He also cited Smith Investment Company v.
Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Court of Appeals 1998) which states that, "a statute
regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."

[R. at 90-94]

Defendant submits that the issues, evidence and authority presented in his
memorandum raised sufficient questions of material fact that summary judgment should
have been denied. Clearly it was raised sufficiently that it should have been at least
considered by the court.

C« Defendant Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact Which Should Preclude
Summary Judgment,
L Plaintiff has created an illegal "spot zone"
The remaining lots owned by Defendant in the Newport subdivision are virtually
the only lots in the entire subdivision to which the 14 zoning applies.2 It would seem that
Plaintiffs plan was and is to reclassify an existing area (one almost surrounded by
industrial uses) and then through time and attrition phase out the non conforming uses.
This apparent plan has created an ordinance which has the effect of creating a spot zone

2

This subdivision was apparently platted prior to Plaintiffs zoning change in 1991.
Therefore virtually all of lots in the subdivision are now valid nonconforming uses under
the current zoning ordinance.
40-

that leaves Defendants lots bordered on at least three sides by lots and property whose
uses are consistent if not almost equivalent with the use Plaintiff is trying to prohibit here.
Spot zoning is defined in Crestvkw-Holladay Homeowners Association, v. Engh
Floral Company 545 P.2d. 1150, (Utah 1976), as follows:
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One type results
when the zoning authority improperly limits the use which may be made of a
small parcel located in the center of an unrestricted area. The second type
of "island" results when most of a large district is devoted to a limited or
restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in one or more spots in the
district.
The spot zoning effect which the Plaintiff has created in this case is the first type
listed above. The Plaintiff has created a situation in which virtually the only lots in this
subdivision owned by Defendant are subject to the zoning ordinance and thus a spot zone
is created.
Defendant concedes that courts give broad discretion to cities legislative zoning
actions and will uphold legislative zoning actions as long as they, "cotiffcf promote the
genexa^welfere; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in tne inffewestof the general
welfare", Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Court of Appeals
1998) quoting Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,141 V.1A 704, (1043). However,
as indicated in Marshall courts may set aside zora&ythat is confirmatory, discriminatory or
arbitrary.

Ah

2» The Effect of Plaintiff s Zoning is EHscriminatorv
The effect of the zoning as applied is discriminatory against Defendant since it
treats him differently than virtually all other persons who own property in the Newport
subdivision. It effectually forbids Defendant from using his property in same way others in
the subdivision and surrounding area are allowed to use their property. In fact it forbids
Defendant from using his property for a use which he is allowed to use other property he
owns which adjoins the property in question.

3. The Effect of the Zoning Law Is a Taking by Plaintiff Without Tust
Compensation
Should this court allow Plaintiff to enforce its stated zoning, it will effect a taking
for which Defendant has not been justly compensated. Defendants property is located in
an area that is primarily if not entirely made up of industrial uses. In fact, as has been
show above, said property is virtually surrounded by industrial type business equivalent to
Defendant. In spite of this reality the only private permitted uses of the property under
the L-l zoning classification is a professional office building3. Considering the surrounding
uses of the area, a professional office building would be economically unfeasible for the

3

The permitted uses for 14 include professional office building and public parks, utilities
and buildings. All other uses are conditional uses. Woods Cross has made clear that they have
not intention of working with plaintiff, having even refused to consider Defendant's conditional
use application citing this appeal.
Al*

property. It would be surrounded by the current industrial park. Simply, Defendant is left
without any viable use for said property.
In Smith Investment Company, supra, the court stated: "A statute regulating the uses
that can be made of property effects a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use
of his land." This is clearly the case here. By attempting to enforce their stated zoning,
Plaintiff is in reality depriving Defendant of any economically viable use of his land
without just compensation.
Defendant understands the broad deference given to municipalities to effect zoning
as they see best. Defendant also submits that when, as in this instance, the effect of such
zoning and the enforcement thereof apparently applies to only one property owner in an
area to his detriment, the municipality has exceeded the limits of such deference. This is
especially true when, as here, there is a history of the municipality and the landowner
being at loggerheads.

IL

The trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to continue its use of lot
14, Newport Subdivision as a preexisting use pursuant to §12-22-101, Woods
Cross Ordinances*
In the trial courts order granting summary judgment, the court found that:
Currently lot fourteen of the property is being used for the parking of
personal vehicles and recreational vehicles such as jet skis, trailers and
campers. [R. at 139]

and based on that finding, concluded that:
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to the extent Defendant ever used lot 14 in its trucking business, said use
has ceased for a period in excess of three months, and therefore may not be
reinitiated under the provisions of the Woods Cross Zoning Ordinance. [R.
at 140]
However, the trial court did not seem to consider whether the "personal vehicles" stored
were being stored on a private basis separate from the trucking company or whether they
were being stored as part of the trucking business as an employee benefit or other trucking
business related use. The court must have made this finding and conclusion based on the
affidavit of Plaintiffs employee, Tim Stephens, who stated that as long as he can
remember this personal vehicles had been stored on this lot. [R. at 129.] Again, however,
the Affidavit of Tim Stephens does not indicate whether the vehicles stored on lot 14
were being stored by and as part of the trucking business.
The only competent evidence on this matter was provided in the second affidavit
of Defendant Douglas Smith. 4 In that affidavit, Douglas Smith stated that lot 14 was
being used by the trucking business and had been so used since 1986. [R. at 111]. Not
only has lot 14 been used prior to zoning enactment, said use is a preexisting nonconforming use and is legally entitled to continue. Utah courts have made clear the fact
that local governments cannot, through zoning changes, require property owners to
discontinue preexisting nonconforming uses. See Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt
Lake City, 481 P.2d 559 (1967). The Gibbons court held that a "zoning ordinance which
4

Douglas Smith is the owner of the property and also the Vice President of the
trucking Company which leases the property. [R. at 32]

requires the discontinuance ... of a nonconforming use would be a deprivation of property
without due process of law." Id. at 563. This unequivocal holding is echoed in § 10-9-408
of the Utah Code which provides with certain exceptions (none of which are applicable
here) that "a nonconforming use may be continued." Similarly, the Cityfs own zoning
ordinances recognize that nonconforming uses may continue at the discretion of the
landowner, not the City. Section 12-22-101 on Prior Non Conforming Uses provides:
This Chapter shall apply to the existing use of a building, structure or land
lawfully established at the time of passage fo the zoning ordinance or any
amendments thereto which does not conform to the present regulations of
the zone in which it is located. Because Woods Cross is a community which
has developed over a long period of time, the regulations of this Chapter are
to allow continued use of such property or structure, while at the same time
protecting existing conforming development and further orderly
development and improvement of the community.
There is no question that Defendant has a valid non-conforming use right with respect to
lot 14. Said lot has been used and is continues to be used to park vehicles as a part of the
trucking business.
The only real issue is whether Woods Cross City, can differentiate between
vehicles on the basis of size, type, color or any other factors. Defendant submits that a
prior existing use as a parking lot is exactly that and that Defendant may continue to park
vehicles of all kinds on lot 14.
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IIL

The trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to use the property as an
accessory use pursuant to §12-14-104, Woods Cross Ordinances*
At the oral arguments on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant

raised the issue of whether property in question should be allowed to be used as an
accessory use to the lawful non-conforming use, [R. at 151, p. 8] Woods Cross
Ordinances §1244404 states:
Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the permitted uses
and conditional uses provided herein may be approved by the city in
accordance with the provisions of this title.
In the case at bar, Defendant has a lawful use for the property which is not in the Newport
subdivision, but contiguous to the Newport Subdivision property. As such, Defendant's
use of the property located in the Newport subdivision should qualify as a valid accessory
use to. The trial court incorrectly failed to address the issue of accessory use.

CONCLUSION
The trial court was in clear error when it failed to consider the affirmative defenses
of spot zoning, discrimination and taking of property without just compensation, raised by
Defendant. Said defenses were adequately pled and created factual issues which would
preclude summary judgment. Further, the trial court again erred in not finding a valid
non-conforming use with respect to lot 14 of the Newport subdivision. Finally the trial
court erred in not considering and finding a valid accessory to Defendants lawful use of
adjoining property as to the remaining lots in question. Accordingly Defendant's request
46-

that the trial court's order granting Summary Judgment be reversed and the case be
remanded for the above issues to be considered.
Dated this 5 th day of July, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this July 6, 2001,1 caused two true and correct copies for
the foregoing Appellant's brief to be served via United States Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Michael Z- Hays
Todd J. Godfrey
Mazuran & Hayes, P-C
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 841244725
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OCT 1 9 2000
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

WOODS CROSS CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,

:
:
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS R. SMITH, dba RALPH
SMITH TRUCKING COMPANY,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:

Case No. 990700317
Judge Darwin C. Hansen

—oooOooo—
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the court on September
21,2000, at 3:00 p.m., before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen. Plaintiff was represented by Todd
J. Godfrey and Michael Z. Hayes. Defendant was represented by Randy B. Birch. The court being
duly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, the court hereby enters its order
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Defendant is the owner of property located within Woods Cross City, which property

is more particularly described in Plaintiffs Memoranda in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment and in the Complaint on file in this matter, (the "Property").
2.

The Property is zoned 1-1, light industrial.

3.

Defendant is currently using Lot 5 and Lots 7 -13 of the Property to park large trucks

and other equipment used in its trucking business.
4.

Currently, Lot 14 of the Property is being used for the parking of personal vehicles

and other recreational vehicles such as jet skis, trailers and campers.
5.

Defendant's use of Lot 5 and Lots 7-13 of the Property is neither a permitted use nor

a conditional use within the 1-1 zone.
6.

Defendant has never applied for nor received conditional use approval or site plan

approval for the operation of a trucking company on the Property.
7.

Plaintiff has requested that Defendant cease its unauthorized use of its Property.

8.

Defendant has failed to comply with the request of the City.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the court HEREBY CONCLUDES AS
FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendants current use of lot 5 and lot 7 through 13 of the Property violates the

Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance.

05\Lit\RS Truck\Order
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2.

Based upon the violation of the City Zoning Ordinance, the City is entitled, as a

matter of law, to an injunction, enjoining any further use in violation of the City Zoning
Ordinance.
3.

To the extent Defendant ever used lot 14 in its trucking business, said use has

ceased for a period in excess of three months, and therefore may not be reinitiated under the
provisions of the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance.
4.

Defendant's claims of spot zoning, discrimination and an unlawful taking of

property without just compensation have not been properly raised through pleadings or affidavits
and therefor may not be considered by the court.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts and conclusions of law, it is HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

Defendant is hereby permanently enjoined from any further use of Lot 5 and Lots

7-14 of the Newport Subdivision in Woods Cross City which violates the City's Zoning
Ordinances and is hereby ordered to cease the use of Lot 5 and Lots 7-14 of the Newport
Subdivision in Woods Cross City for its trucking operations.
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DATED this _£_ day o f / < ^ < -

2000.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

By:.
Randy B. Birch
Bertch & Birch - East
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^[/ day of September, 2000,1 caused to be mailed, firstclass United States mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to
the following:
Randy B. Birch
Bertch & Birch - East
114 South 200 West
P.O. Box 763
HeberCity,UT 84032

J^HXAJX

A^W/lM^
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Case No. 990700317
Appellant Case No. 20001024 - SC

Plaintiff;

DOUGLAS R. SMITH dba RALPH
SMITH TRUCKING COMPANY,
Defendant.

HEARING HELD SEPTEMBER 21, 2000
BEFORE
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN

ORIGINAL
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

TODD J. GODFREY
MAZURAN & HAYES

For the Defendant:

RANDY B. BIRCH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *

FARMINGTON, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 21,2000
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN PRESIDING
P R 0 C E E D I N G S
The next matter is the case of Woods

THE COURT:

Cross City against Douglas R. Smith.
990700317.

This is» case number

This is the time set for the motion for summary

judgment by Woods Cross City in this matter.
And counsel, may I have you, for the record, make
your appearances please?
MR. GODFREY:

Your Honor, Todd Godfrey with Michael

Hayes for Woods Cross City.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. BIRCH:

Randy Birch and Doug (inaudible) on

behalf of Doug Smith, Your Honor*
THE COURT:
MR. ?:

All right.

Thank you.

Just to clarify, Randy Birch is the attorney,

Doug Smith is [inaudible].
THE COURT:
UNKNOWN:

I understand.

Okay.

THE COURT:

I understand.

And I thank you very much

for [inaudible].
Gentlemen, I have reviewed the written memorandum
filed on this case and most of the cases that you have
submitted.

And I know Woods Cross has submitted copies of

cases that have been highlighted and I have reviewed those

1

matters.
With that in mind, Mr. Godfrey, ;/ou may proceed, if
you wish.
MR. GODFREY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Do you need a easel cDf some kind?

THE COURT:

MR. GODFREY:

If wei had one that would be helpful.

I

understand we don't and we'11. have to make use of some chairs,
I guess.
Randy, can you see okay?
MR. BIRCH:

Actually, no .

MR. GODFREY:

But I1rll make due.

I'll move out here for just a moment

[inaudibl e], *four Honor.
THE COURT:

You have filed -

MR. GODFREY:
THE COURT:

Similar math.

Yes. And let me just - I'm with you.

Go

ahead.
MR. GODFREY:

Okay.

Your Honor, this - generally

this shows the property that's at issue.

If you'll note

there's kind of a heavy cross line right here.

This is the

boundary between West Bountiful City and Woods Cross City.
Ralph Smith Trucking generally occupies this property and a
portion of this property below.
This property here that is outlined in green on the
map is property that is not at issue in this case.

The city

recognizes that Smith Trucking has been using this property for

2

an extended period of time.

We believe they have a valid non-

conforming use on all the property that's shown as marked in
green.

And, you know, that's not at issue at all in this

matter.
THE COURT:

And that is property within the

boundaries of Woods Cross City?
MR. GODFREY:
THE COURT:

From here down it is.
I see.

MR. GODFREY:

From the line up it's in West

Bountiful.
THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

MR. GODFREY:

The property that's outlined in yellow

is property that's within the New Port subdivision.

Mr. Smith

essentially owns lot five and lot seven through 14 of the New
Port Subdivision.

And that's the property that is an issue in

this matter.
The property down here below the New Port Subdivision
- it's not really shown on the map, it's just shown as a vacant
parcel is a newly approved residential subdivision in the city.
Just currently homes are being constructed within that area.
By way of orientation I think that sort of describes
the property we're talking about.
THE COURT:

And I have found -

MR. GODFREY:
THE COURT:

Good.

Do you have a copy of this, Mr. Birch?

3

MR. BIRCH:

I don't believe I've seen it.

MR. GODFREY:

It actually is attached to his

memorandum, not to the city's.
MR. BIRCH:

Yeah - oh - yeah.

All right.

The colors

there are different but that could have happened in the copies.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. GODFREY:

I understand.

Your Honor, this property - the

property at issue, outlined in yellow on the map that I've just
shown the Court, is zoned 1-1.

It's a light industrial zone.

The use that's currently taking place on that property is not
an allowed use under the city's zoning statutes.

State law

provides that the city has the right to an injunction.
Essentially estoppel may be used that's in violation of the
zoning ordinances.

That statute set forth in Utah code

annotated section 10-9-1002.
Case law also supports the city's right to an
injunction.

Case law specifically provides that the city

doesn't have to show any kind of irreparable injury to be
entitled to that injunctive relief.
In their brief, the defendants have attempted to
raise an issue as to the use of lot 14 of the subdivision.
That's

outlined

in blue

on the map as you can see right here.

In that respect I would refer the Court to the second affidavit
of Tim Stevens which is attached to our reply memorandum.

With

that affidavit are pictures which are authenticated by Mr.

4

Stevens as being true and accurate representations of the
property on a day he viewed that early this month. And those
pictures show the current use of that property.

There are no

trucks of Ralph Smith Trucking parked on that property.
property is fenced in.

That

It's separated from the rest of the

property and it's currently being used to park normal passenger
type vehicles and some small recreational vehicles, campers and
other things, but there are no large trucks on that property.
In addition, Mr. Stevens states in his capacity as a
zoning administrator, he's familiar with the property and that
it hasn't been used to park large trucks, in his memory, for an
extended period of time.

City ordinances provide that if a use

has ceased for a period in excess of three months, that use is
essentially abandoned and a property can't again be applied to
a non-conforming use.
We think that's the status of this property.

We

don't believe that Smith Trucking has any right to park their
large trucks on lot 14 in the New Port Subdivision.
In summary, I actually really truly believe this is a
very, very simple matter.

It was either late *96 or early *97

when Smith Trucking began to expand their operations from the
permitted where I guess the allowed property in West Bountiful
down into this property in Woods Cross City, where the zoning
is not appropriate for that use and where they don't have any
valid non-conforming use rights.

5

1

In early *97 the city contacted the owners and told

2

them their use was unlawful.

3

the city to cease that use.

4

of the city's regulations and I don't believe there's any

5

genuine issue of material fact as to any of the use of those

6

properties.

7
8

They have ignored the orders from
They're defiant in their disregard

And on that matter we'd submit.

I would like to

reserve some time for rebuttal on this.

9

THE COURT:

You may.

Thank you Mr. Godfrey.

10

Mr. Birch, please?

11

MR. BIRCH:

12

I realize the Court hasn't had opportunity to view

Thank you, Your Honor.

13

the property like counsel has, but it does change your

14

perspective.

15

I've been to the site. And I've looked at the

16

property.

17

not, I went back out and looked at the property and I think

18

it's - a couple of points that I want to make.

19

And then as this came closer to briefing and what

First of all, that this property is only - the only

20

permitted use is a public park or utility, I think it says.

21

Right?

22

Or an office building.
Your Honor, right here we have a railroad track.

23

Right here - admittedly, this is West Bountiful, okay, it's not

24

Woods Cross.

25

fact there are some large silver, [inaudible] what they're

It's a - it's a huge refinery.

As a matter of

called.

Some sort of a - that Phillips owns, and they have

purchased this huge - this large lot as a buffer.
vacant trailer court.

It's a

Now are you - are we really going to put

office buildings in an area that Phillips has determined is
worth buying to create a buffer in case of an explosion?
don't think so, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I

In fact, I'll guarantee it.

Are you arguing that the zoning is wrong

and the city shouldn't have passed that zone?
MR. BIRCH:

That is an argument.

trying to argue right now.

It's not what I'm

I'm trying to - I just want you to-

THE COURT:

If that's [inaudible] -

MR. BIRCH:

- understand a picture.

THE COURT:

That standard is an awfully tough

standard [inaudible].
MR. BIRCH:

I've not filed suit for that.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BIRCH:

May in the future, I guess.

not where we're at.
area, Your Honor.

But that's

I'm just trying to paint a picture of this

Okay?

There's another set of railroad tracks right here.
So you've got railroad tracks to the west, railroad tracks to
the east and my client owns most - well, between him and
Phillips probably half of the land in between.
I also think it's important, note, and maybe I get
caught up in - I know I get caught up in my cases.

But Ralph

7

Smith Trucking uses this area that they do not dispute.
offices are here.

His trucking service bays are here.

His
All

that is occurring back here is the parking of vehicles.

And I

would note that the I-l zone calls for office buildings, yadda
yadda.

We obviously don't have an office building.

conditional uses are automotive service centers.

But

Well, we

don't even have an automotive service center in that area.
Although, I would represent that we were applying and have
applied for a conditional use permit.

We keep being told that

it's not worth the (inaudible) time we're not going to give it
to you.

But at my insistence my client have applied, Your

Honor.
But I think it's also important to note that 1214-104
talks about accessory uses.

Access

- and this is not part of

my brief, as I got the statutes I started to review them again.
Accessory uses, incidental to permitted use and conditional
uses provided herein may be approved by the city in accordance
with the provisions as titled.

I guess that means that

incidental uses can be conditional.
that language says.

I'm not sure quite what

But my point is only this, their actual

bays and shops are in West Bountiful.

Their offices are in

West Bountiful. Any parking that goes on in this space is
incidental to what activity is actually occurring in West
Bountiful.

And I think that's important for the Court to know.

We would dispute their categorization of not parking

here.

I don't see how the size of the truck that you're

parking in an area means you can or can't park it there or it's
a change of use. At least I've not distinguished as I perused
- and I'll be the first to admit I haven't digested this volume
-but as I pursued these ordinances I did not see a distinction
between the size of vehicles you're parking.

And indeed, most

of the vehicles and some of the accessories counsel has
referenced, are parked there for - on behalf of employees.
They're actually employees things that are parked there.
Employee parking for lack of a better statement.
So my point that I'm trying to make is that the
business is in West Bountiful.
here.

There is parking going on back

Absolutely, we're not trying to deny that.

photos that have been provided.

Look at the

You can sort of see the area,

weeds and photos. My client has talked to some of the
neighbors that are building here to the south.
little bit of a concern.

That was a

And they'd rather have him there

parking his vehicles than other options.

Not necessarily

relevant but I think it is important for the Court to
understand that they've in essence done, is created a zone
where Doug Smith owns most of the property and then tell him he
can't use it.
I think I've addressed the lot 14 issue, Your Honor.
Like I said, I think it's important to look at this zoning
picture as a whole and evaluate whether or not this is a, like

9

1

I say, I think it's an accessory use.

2

Do you have any questions, Your Honor?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. GODFREY:

I don't.

Thank you.

Your Honor, as to the argument that

5

this is an accessory use to a primary use, Mr. Birch's own

6

statement is that that requires approval from the city.

7

city never gave him that approval and there's never been an

8

application made for that.

9

The

Additionally, this is completely different parcel and

10

parcels of property.

11

certainly require the city's approval or at least review and

12

the city hasn't even had the opportunity to do that.

13

Accessory use on a different parcel would

Mr. Smith has known that the city objects to this use

14

of the property since that lease in 1997 and he's made no

15

effort, at all, to come into compliance with the city's

16

regulations.

17

As to the issues about lot 14, I would simply

18

indicate that I think as a matter of law the Court can

19

distinguish between the parking of passenger vehicles and

20 I campers without the truck, from the parking of huge double
21

belly dump trucks and trailers.
I

There's a significant

4

22

difference in terms of the impact on the property and the

23

impact on the adjoining uses, one of which, I would point out,

24

is a residential subdivision.

25

As to Mr. Birch's arguments regarding the zoning, the

10

1

time to challenge the wisdom of Wood Cross City zoning

2

decisions passed, at the very latest, in early 1992. These

3

regulations have been on the books for a significant amount of

4

time*

5

He indicates that the city has zoned Mr. Smith's

6

property.

Mr. Smith didn't purchase this property until four

7

or five years after the zoning went into effect.

8

property here. Most of these lots were purchased by him in x96

9

or x97 - or ^95 excuse me.

10

He owned the

Finally, as to lot 14, I think it's very important to

11

note that there is absolutely no issue of fact whatsoever that

12

would indicate that the use of these lots, five and seven

13

through 13, have in any way gained any rights or any - I guess

14

approvals - for use.

15

other than those in the brief regarding spot zoning and

16

discriminatory zoning and takings which aren't properly before

17

the Court.

18

there's been no motion to admit a complaint.

19

aren't before the Court and they don't

20

test on the merits that's set forth in our brief.

21

There are no defenses as to those lots

They aren't brought forth in any proper pleading;
They simply

- they don't pass any

I think, again, the issues in this case are very

22

simple.

23

I think the city is entitled to the injunction and I would ask

24

the Court to so rule.

25

It's cut and dried that it is a summary judgment case.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

11

Gentlemen I have reviewed the case law which you have
submitted to me and I've also reviewed the written memorandum.
And it seems to me the relevant facts in this case, that are
uncontroverted are those relevant facts set forth in the moving
papers filed by Woods Cross. And now Mr. Smith has raised some
issues in his further statement of facts, but I do not see
those issues to be a statement of material fact that gives rise
to an issue relative to the legal principles that need to be
applied in this case.
I think the motion for summary judgment should be
granted and I'm going to grant the injunction based upon the
summary judgment motion.
I'm going to request, Mr. Godfrey, that you prepare
an appropriate order.

And that order should set forth the

uncontroverted facts as I've indicated in your moving papers
and that order also set forth conclusions of law consistent
with your moving paper and also with respect to the reply.
The Court believes that the issue of spot zoning
discrimination or a taking without just compensation doesn't
give rise to a material issue of fact in this case because they
are not listed as an affirmative defense and I think it's
improper for me to consider those matters as creating an issue
of fact.
For those reasons I'm going to grant the motion and
proceed on that basis.

12

And Mr. Godfrey, submit the proposed paper to the
other side for their review and then submit it to me.
MR. BIRCH:

Your Honor, could we get a certification

of the final decision on that.
THE COURT:

Pardon?

MR. BIRCH:

Certification 60-40 or 50-40 or whatever

[inaudible].
THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR. GODFREY:
THE COURT:

No.
I - this then - this resolves the

litigation in full, does it not?
MR. GODFREY:
THE COURT:

It does, Your Honor.

Well, then I don't know that you need a

certification then if it's a final order.
The claim of the city goes for an injunction.
granted that, that is the final order.

I've

And if you wish to

appeal then of course you may do so.
Anything further, counsel?
MR. GODFREY:

Nothing further.

MR. BIRCH:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon the proceedings were concluded)
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Randy Birch (#4197)
Bertch & Birch - East
114 South 200 West
P.O. Box 763
Heber City, Utah 84032
Telephone: (801) 654-4300
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WOODS CROSS CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS SMITH

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No.990700317

DOUGLAS R. SMITH, dba RALPH SMITH |
TRUCKING COMPANY,
|

Judge Darwin C. Hansen

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
AflBant, DOUGLAS SMITH, being first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant is over the age of twenty one (21) years or age, a resident of the state of Utah, competent
to testify, and that the statements made herein are based on personal knowledge or where so
stated on information and belief.

2.

Affiant is the owner of the real property which is the subject of this action.

3.

Affiant leases said property to Ralph Smith Co.

4.

Ralph Smith Co. has continuously used the site in question since 1991 as a truck yard.

To the best of affiant's knowledge, most of the property around Defendants site does not comply
with the city's stated zoning classification.
Plaintiff approached affiant requesting to purchase a portion of said site and their request was
refused.
Affiant does not have the letters claimed sent by Plaintiff and has not received copies of said
letters as a part of this lawsuit.
All of the other information which affiant needs to defend against this action is in the control and
or possession of Plaintiff.
Said information includes dates and changes of zoning; compliance and/or grants of variances or
conditional use permits to surrounding property; enforcement proceedings regarding zoning
against other nearby property owners; Plaintiffs desire to acquire said site; and prior court
decisions.
Further Affiant Sayeth Not:
Dated this /

c

^ Day of June 2000.

Douglas
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this.

Day of June, 2000.

NOTARY PUBLIC

RANDY B. BIRCH
5296 S Commerce Or No 100
Sal! Lake City, Utah 84107
'v< Commission Expires
u«gust 8 2000
r
' ~'~ J T\II

/

'(c%

^JC

^Notary Public
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify than on

fc-(3

, 2000,1:

BJ mailed postage prepaid
[] faxed to No.
[] hand delivered
a true and correct copy of the Foregoing Affidavit of Douglas Smith, to the following:
Michael Z. Hays
Todd J. Godfrey
Mazuran & Hayes, P.C
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725
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Randy B. Birch, #4197
BERTCH & BIRCH - East
114 South 200 West
P.O. Box 763
Heber City, Utah 84032
Telephone: (801) 654-4300
Attorneys for Defendant
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WOODS CROSS CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS R. SMITH

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No.990700317

DOUGLAS R. SMITH, dba RALPH
SMITH TRUCKING COMPANY,

Judge Darwin C. Hansen

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Affiant, DOUGLAS SMITH, being first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant is over the age of twenty one (21) years or age, a resident of the state of Utah,
competent to testify, and that the statements made herein are based on personal
knowledge or where so stated, on information and belief.

2.

Affiant is the owner of the real property located in Woods Cross City.

3.

Part of said property is located in the Newport subdivision.

A

TU<±

mmaininn nr™v*rtv thmioh rnntioiioii^ to affiant's Newnort subdivision nrooertv, is

not part of the Newport subdivision. See the attached Exhibit A.
5.

Affiant leases all of said property to Ralph Smith Co.

6.

Ralph Smith Co. has continuously used the property located outside the Newport
Subdivision since before 1991 to run it's trucking business.

7.

Regarding the property inside the subdivision, Affiant is the owner of lots 5 and 7-14 of
the Newport subdivision. See Exhibit A.

8.

Prior to Affiant purchasing said Newport subdivision property, Ralph Smith Co. had
already leased and used lot 14 of the Newport subdivision as part of its trucking business
continuously since 1986.

9.

To the best of affiant's knowledge, most, if not all of the property around Defendants site
does not comply with the city's stated zoning classification.

10.

Lots 3 and 4 of the Newport subdivision are used as a steel fabrication plant and paint
manufacturing plant respectively. See Exhibit A.

11.

The property located directly east of lot 5 of said subdivision is owned by Affiant or
Phillips 66 company (Phillips 66 uses said property as a buffer zone for possible pressure
explosion). See Exhibit A.

12.

Plaintiff owns lot 6 of said subdivision, and based upon information and belief, plans to
dig a flood-water catch-pond on said site. See Exhibit A.

13.

The property along the eastern edge of Affiant's property is a rail road track. See Exhibit
A.
D«.~r^ O ~ * *

A
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14.

Other Newport subdivision lots are used as follows:
Lot 1 — Contractors open storage lot
Lot 2 — Interstate battery, storage and distribution/trucking
Lot 20 — Hansen Insulation, storage and distribution/trucking
Lot 15 — Fiberglass fabrication and distribution shop
Lot 16 — Cargo Trailers storage lot
Lot 17 — Open storage lot
Lot 18 & 22 — Hawk open storage lot
Lot 23 — Green concrete containers and equipment storage
See Exhibit A.

15.

There are high voltage power lines and towers which cross the Newport subdivision
property, including the property owned by Affiant.

16.

The use of affiant's property is consistent with other uses in the area, especially the
Newport subdivision.

17.

Affiant sees no economical viable uses of said property considering the surrounding uses
and the permitted uses under the 1-1 zoning classification.

18.

Prior to this action, Plaintiff approached Affiant requesting to purchase a portion of his
property to use as part of Woods Cross's flood control plan, and Affiant declined to sell.

19.

Woods Cross then asked Affiant for a site plan. Affiant said he would provide the same
once a flood control plan was provided so as to avoid reworking the site. No flood
control plan was ever provided to Affiant, and indeed, to this day, uncontrolled storm
water flows across Affiant's property.

20.

Affiant believes this lawsuit may have been motivated in retaliation for Affiant's
unwillingness to sell.

Further Affiant sayeth notDated this ^

day of September 2000.

Douglas Smith, Affiant
Subscribed and swom to before me this
NOTARY PU3UC
CARROL L HOGGATT
230 West 1500 South
BoumrfuJ, UT 34010
COMMISSION
EXPIRES
w
av 15, 2003
STATE OF UTAH

^

day of September, 2000

Notary Public

SERVICE CERTIFICATE
1 hereby certify than on September 5. 2000.1:
[X] mailed postage prepaid
[X] faxed to No. 801 272-1551
f] hand delivered
a true and correct copy of the Foregoing Second Affidavit of Douglas Smith, to the
following:
Michael Z: Hays
Todd J. Godfrey
Mazuran Sc Hayes, P.C.
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725
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Lot I — Contractors open storage lot
Lot 3 - Steel fabrication plant
Lot 4 ~ Paint manufacturing; nlant
Lot 2 ~ Interstate battery warehouse and truck parking
Lot 20 ~ Hansen Insulation truck yard
Lot 15 -- Fiberglass fabrication shop
Lot 16 — Cargo Trailers storage lot
Lot 17 — Open storage lot
Lot 18 & 22 -- Hawk onen storage lot
Lot 23 — Green concrete, shipping containers and equipment ston
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Property at issue
Prior Use property at issue

